In 1999, Huggins’ driver license was suspended by the Department of Public Safety for 7 years and 90 days following his fourth alcohol-related driving offense under the state’s Administrative Per Se statute, 32-5A-304. On September 25, 2002, Huggins filed a declaratory judgment action seeking clarification of the meaning 32-5-192(c) and a declaration that the Director of Public Safety had exceeded his authority to order such a period of suspension. DPS filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court granted the DPS motion holding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Huggins had failed t file a timely appeal of the decision to suspend his driver license.

On review, the Court held:

1. An action for a declaratory judgment is not a substitute for appeal;
2. “When a special statutory procedure has been provided as an exclusive method of review for a particular type case, no other statutory review is available.” Howle v. Alabama State Milk Control Board, 90 So. 2d 752,755 (Ala. 1956);
3. Section 32-5A-300 (c) provides a process for administrative review. Under 32-5A-306(e), a person may request an administrative review at any time within 90 days of the notice of suspension;
4. Section 32-5A-308 provides that a person held to a suspension period under 32-5A-304 by the Department “shall have the right to file a petition in the circuit court of the county where the arrest was made for judicial review.”

Since Huggins’ challenge to the Director’s action came two and one-half years after the determination of suspension, and the statutory method of review was not utilized, his declaratory judgment action would be an impermissible substitute for appeal.